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FIFTH AMENDMENT-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)
Since 1966, when the Supreme Court held in
Miranda v. Arizona1 that specific warnings must be
given to subjects of police interrogation in order to
preserve the rights guaranteed under the fifth amend-
ment, the Court has devoted much effort to the task
of applying the principles of Miranda to factual
situations ranging from those closely resembling
Miranda to those only tangentially.related. This task
has again arisen in two recent cases. The Court has
considered the consequences that a subject of custo-
dial interrogation may suffer as a result of asserting
his right to remain silent. In Doyle v. Ohio, 'where
the defendants had not offered to police at the time of
their arrest the exculpatory explanation they later
gave at trial, the Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits prose-
cution use of the post-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes. In Michigan v. Mosley, 'where an accused
had exercised his right to remain silent during an ini-
tial interrogation by one police officer but had made
inculpatory statements during later questioning by a
second officer regarding an unrelated crime, the
Court held the later statements were admissible at
trial.
In Doyle v. Ohio,4 the two defendants were
arrested for the attempted sale of ten pounds of
marijuana to an informant for a local narcotics
investigation unit. The informant had arranged a
meeting at which the defendants allegedly passed the
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, a landmark decision
in the development of the rights of the accused, the Court
enunciated the principle that police custodial interrogation
creates an atmosphere that is inherently psychologically
coercive such that any statement elicited from the accused in
such an atmosphere could not truly be considered a product
of his free will. Therefore, the Court held that certain
procedural safeguards had to be observed in order to
legitimate custodial interrogation. The subject must be
advised that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him at trial, that he has a right to
have an attorney with him during questioning, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed. If these
safeguards are not met, no evidence obtained as a result of
the questioning can be used against the defendant.
'96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
3423 U.S. 96 (1975).
496 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
marijuana to him. When the defendants were taken
into custody by the police, it was discovered that they
possessed $1,320, which the informant claimed to
have paid to them. Subsequent to the custodial
search, full Miranda warnings were given to the de-
fendants.
At trial, the defendants testified that the informant
had in fact arranged to sell the marijuana to them,
and that he had left with them the $1,320 in an
attempt to frame them by making it appear that they
were the sellers. This explanation, which Justice
Powell, speaking for the majority, described as "not
entirely implausible," ' was not contradicted with
evidence by the State.
The prosecutor on cross-examination was allowed
to question each of the defendants as to why he had
not offered this explanation to the authorities at the
time of arrest. To this inquiry, the defendants replied
with a "jumble of" responses" ' and were subse-
quently convicted. Their convictions were affirmed
by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio
denying review. 7
In argument before the United States Supreme
Court, the State contended that the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the defendants was necessary
due to the discrepancy between the defendants'
exculpatory statements at trial and their silence at
the time of the arrest. Such discrepancy gave rise to
an inference that the exculpatory story had been
fabricated. The defendants' silence, in other words,
was tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement. It
was therefore proper, the State argued, for the
prosecutor to comment upon this inconsistency for
the limited purpose of impeachment. In support of its
proposition, the State cited Harris v. New York 'and
Oregon v. Hass, 9two cases in which the Court had
'1d. at 2242.
'Id. at 2246 (Stevens', J., dissenting). The responses
given included such replies as: "I didn't know what [the
police officer] was talking about:" "Because I wanted to
get my hands on [the informant] because I suspected he was
trying [to frame me]." "I didn't like someone putting me
in a spot like that." Id. at 2246-47 n.4.
71d. at 2246-47.
8401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'420 U. S. 714 (1975).
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permitted the use of post-arrest inconsistent state-
ments for impeachment purposes, even though these
statements were clearly inadmissible as evidence of
guilt because of Miranda violations.
In Harris, the Court held that although incrimi-
nating statements which were obtained by the police
before the defendant had been given the Miranda
warnings were not admissible as evidence of the
defendant's guilt, they nonetheless could be used by
the prosecution to impeach the defendant's credi-
bility as a witness in his own behalf. The Court
reasoned that:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to
commit perjury. . . Having voluntarily taken the
stand, [the defendant] was under an obligation to
speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution
here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-test-
ing devices of the adversary process ...
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted
into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances. "
In Hass, the defendant upon arrest was advised of
his rights in accordance with Miranda. While still in
the patrol car he was questioned concerning the
alleged crime and he responded that he wanted an
attorney. The officer told him that he could phone an
attorney when they arrived at the police station. The
defendant then made incriminating statements in
response to further questions. The Court held that
these incriminating statements, though inadmissible
at trial as evidence of guilt, were admissible for the
limited purposes of impeachment of the defendant's
trial testimony. The Court relied upon the rationale
employed in Harris in concluding that the valuable
aid that this evidence would provide for the jury in
assessing the defendant's credibility far outweighed
any "speculative possibility" " that police miscon-
duct would thereby be encouraged.
In the instant case, the Court, is while recognizing
the importance of the impeachment process in the
criminal justice system, nonetheless rejected the
State's argument on two grounds. First, the Court
rejected the contention that silence at the time of
arrest is inconsistent with exculpatory statements at
'0401 U.S. 225-26.
11420 U.S. at 723.
2Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Marshall joined.
trial. The Court reasoned that silence in the wake of
Miranda warnings could have been caused by the
defendants' desire to exercise those rights of which
they had just been advised. Silence at the time of
arrest is therefore "insoluably ambiguous because of
what the State is required to advise the person
arrested." "5 Because of this insoluable ambiguity, the
defendants' silence at the time of arrest is of "dubious
probative value." 4 Consequently, prosecutorial use
of this silence for impeachment purposes was deemed
improper.
Furthermore, the Court went beyond this evidenti-
ary rationale and based its decision upon constitu-
tional grounds, holding that the use of the defend-
ants' silence for impeachment purposes violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court reasoned that although the Miranda warnings
carry no express assurance that the subject's exercise
of his right to remain silent will entail no penalty,
such assurance is implicit in the givipg of the warn-
ings. When the police inform a suspect in custody
that he has a right to remain silent, this information
carries with it an implied guarantee that the suspect
may exercise that right without fear that its exercise
will later be used against him. Therefore, concluded
the Court, to allow the accused's assertion of his right
to be employed against him even for the limited pur-
pose of impeaching his testimony at trial would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process of law. "s
The dissenting Justices 6 argued that the defen-
dants' silence at the time of arrest was "graph-
ically inconsistent"'" with their later exculpatory
testimony at trial. If the defendants had really been
framed by the police informant, as they claimed at
trial, then their failure to mention this at the time of
arrest was "almost inexplicable." is Their silence,
the dissent concludes, is therefore tantamount to a
prior inconsistent statement and admissible for
impeachment purposes.
" 96 S.Ct. at 2244.
4Id. at 2245 n.8. The Court here was reiterating its
holding in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). See
text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
i"96 S.Ct. at 2245.
sJustices Stevens, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
1796 S.Ct. at 2246.
11d.
isPrior inconsistent statements of any witness are
admissible to impeach his testimony at trial, the theory
being that because the two sets of statements cannot both be
true, their contradictory nature is indicative of the lack of
credibility of the witness. See 3A J. WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE
[Vol. 67
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Furthermore, the dissent finds the majority's due
process rationale erroneous as applied to the facts of
the case at hand. The dissent contends that the de-
fendants' silence at the time of arrest was not the
result of reliance upon the right to remain silent,
or they would have so stated at trial in response to
the prosecutor's questions. Instead, they gave a
"jumble of responses," 20 which negates the major-
ity's presumption that the defendants' silence was in-
duced by reliance on Miranda. Without this basic
presumption, the dissent argues, the majority's due
process argument falls. Without reliance upon the
Miranda warnings, the situation is no different than
if no such warnings had not been given at all. Noth-
ing in the majority's opinion, states the dissent, sug-
gests that there would be any unfairness or denial of
due process in the prosecutor's use of a defendant's
prior silence for impeachment purposes where no
Miranda warnings were given. 2
The effect of Doyle on prior law is that it
constitutionalizes the right of an accused not to have
his silence in reliance upon the Miranda warnings
later used to impeach his trial testimony. Prior to
Doyle, the right was purely evidentiary. In Raffel v.
United States2" the Court held that the fifth amend-
ment did not prohibit use of the defendant's prior
assertion of his right to remain silent to impeach his
exculpatory trial testimony. The defendant in Raffel
had declined to take the stand at his first trial2 2 to
rebut a government agent's incriminating testimony.
At the second trial the government agent gave similar
testimony and this time the defendant did take the
stand to rebut that testimony. The court then asked
questions which required him to disclose that he had
declined to testify at the first trial in exercise of his
right to remain silent. The Supreme Court reasoned
that this did not violate the defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination because the
immunity which the fifth amendment affords an
accused is waived by him when he takes the stand at
trial:
When [the defendant] takes the stand in his own
behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the
§§ 1017, 1040 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1970). See also note 27
infra and accompanying text.
2096 S.Ct. at 2246. See note 6 supra.
2'Id. at 2248.
22271 U.S. 494 (1926). There is doubt as to whether
Raffel is good law today in light of more recent Supreme
Court rulings concerning the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 'ee notes 49 & 50 infra and
accompanying text.
"'The first trial resulted in a hung jury.
limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-
examined . . . for the purpose of impeaching his
credibility. 2
In Grunewald v. United States, 25 where the
defendant's assertion of the privilege before the grand
jury was used to impeach his exculpatory trial
testimony,2 6 the Court held that under established
principles of evidence a defendant's prior silence
could be used to impeach his trial testimony if, but
only if, his prior assertion of his right to remain silent
was inconsistent with his subsequent exculpatory
trial testimony. 2 The Court pointed out three factors
bearing on the conclusion that the defendant's asser-
tion of his fifth amendment privilege before the grand
jury was not inconsistent with his exculpatory
testimony at trial. First, the defendant repeatedly
2"271 U.S. at 497.
25353 U.S. 391 (1957).
26The facts in Grunewald were these: Two New York
business firms which were under investigation for tax fraud
established contact with the defendant Halperin, a New
York attorney. Halperin, for a large fee, conducted negotia-
tions on behalf of these firms with an influential friend in
Washington who was accused of bribing an I.R.S. official to
drop criminal prosecution. Halperin was called before a
grand jury investigating corruption in the Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue and was asked questions regarding his connec-
tion with the scheme. Halperin refused to answer these
questions, claiming his fifth amendment privilege and re-
peatedly asserting his innocence. At trial, Halperin was
asked some of these same questions and he answered them
in a way consistent with his innocence. The government
was then allowed to bring out in cross-examination that
the defendant had pleaded the fifth amendment privilege
before the grand jury.
27That is, if his prior silence was inconsistent with his
innocence. See 3AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1017, 1040,
1042, 1071: prior statements of a defendant are admissible
for impeachment purposes if there exists a "real inconsist-
ency" between those statements and the defendant's trial
testimony. "The purpose is to induce the tribunal to discard
the one statement because the [defendant] has also made
another statement which cannot at the same time be true"
(§ 1040). Inconsistent prior silence is likewise admissible
for impeachment purposes because a "failure to assert a
fact, when it would have been natural to assert it, amounts
in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact" (§
1042) [emphasis supplied]. In other words, when a defen-
dant's prior silence is inconsistent with his innocence (that
is, with his exculpatory trial testimony) this silence is ad-
missible to impeach his testimony because it amounts to a
prior inconsistent statement.
See also Note, 112 U. PA. L.'REv. 210 (1963) for a
discussion of the theory that failure to deny an accusation is
evidence of the truth of that accusation. The author
concludes that because of the meagre probative value of
silence in the face of accusation and the prejudicial nature of
use of that silence at trial, strict standards of admissibility
ought to be employed.
1976]
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asserted his innocence at the grand jury inquest and
had insisted that he pleaded the fifth amendment
only on the advice of his attorney. Second, the
secretive nature of the grand jury proceedings bore
heavily upon what inferences could legitimately be
drawn from the assertion of the privilege before that
body. 28 Finally, when the accused had asserted his
privilege before the grand jury, he was "quite
evidently already considered a potential defendant
[and it was therefore] quite natural for him to fear
that he was being asked questions for the very
purpose of providing evidence against himself." 29
Again, the constitutional permissibility of prosecu-
torial use of an accused's silence during police
interrogation to impeach his subsequent trial testi-
mony was left unsettled by the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona. " There, after holding that a defendant
must be advised that he has a right to remain silent
in the face of police interrogation, the Court noted:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissi-
ble to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custo-
dial interrogation. The prosecution may not, there-
fore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation. "
Prosecutors argued, as did the prosecutor in Doyle,
that what the Court in Miranda meant to proscribe
by this language was only the use of a defend-
ant's prior silence as evidence of guilt and not as
evidence for impeachment purposes.2 This argu-
"" [The defendant] was a compelled, and not a voluntary,
witness; . . . he was not represented by counsel; . . . he
could summon no witness; ... [and] he had no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him.
... Innocent men are more likely to plead the privilege in
secret proceedings, where they testify without advice of
counsel and without opportunity for cross-examination,
than in open court proceedings where cross-examination
and judicially supervised procedure provide safeguards
for the establishing of the whole, as against the possibility
of merely partial, truth." 353 U.S. at 422-23.
29353 U.S. at 423.
20384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1 Id. at468 n.37.
"2On the basis of this language and the tone of the
Miranda decision in general, the majority of federal and
state courts that dealt with the issue of the constitutional
permissibility for prosecutorial use for impeachment pur-
poses of the defendant's silence during custodial interroga-
tion prior to Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
held that such silence was inadmissible for impeachment
purposes as well as for proving guilt. See Note, 32 LA. L.
REv. 650, 652 n.11 (1972) for a collection of the cases so
holding.
ment was given support when the Court held in
Harris v. New York2 that a confession which was
inadmissible to prove the guilt of a defendant because
of Miranda violations was nonetheless admissible to
impeach the defendant's exculpatory trial testimony.
The Court was again faced with the issue of the
permissibility of a prosecutor's use of a defendant's
prior silerice to impeach his trial testimony in United
States v. Hale, "where the prosecutor confronted the
defendant on cross-examination with the fact that he
had stood mute at the time of arrest in the face of
accusations. " The Court in Hale purposely avoided
reaching the question of whether or not prosecutorial
use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's prior
silence was constitutionally proscribed and specifi-
cally limited its holding to evidentiary grounds. The
Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Grune-
wald v. United States2" that a defendant's prior as-
sertion of his right to remain silent cannot be used
to impeach his exculpatory trial testimony if his prior
silence is consistent with that trial testimony. The
Court went beyond a mere reiteration of Grunewald,
however, by holding that a defendant's silence in the
face of police custodial interrogation is never incon-
sistent with exculpatory statements at trial. A variety
of reasons, said the Hale Court, may have influ-
enced the arrestee's decision to remain silent: (1) he
had no duty to speak; (2) his silence may have been
in reliance on his right to remain silent under Mi-
randa; or (3) the intimidating atmosphere of arrest
may have led him to stand mute. Consequently, the
defendant's silence at the time of arrest is of little
3 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See discussion of Harris at note
10 supra and accompanying text.
34422 U.S. 171 (1975).
"In Hale the defendant was pointed out on the street
and identified to police as one of the participants in a recent
robbery. When police approached the defendant, he at-
tempted to flee but was apprehended, placed under arrest,
and advised of his rights under Miranda. Upon being
searched he was found in possession of S158 in cash. In
response to police questioning, the defendant stood mute. At
his trial, however, he took the stand and testified (1) that he
was in a narcotics treatment center at the time of the crime;
(2) that after leaving the center he was in the company of a
friend who subsequently purchased narcotics; (3) that he
fled when approached by police because he feared being
found in the presence of a person carrying narcotics; and (4)
that the money he had with him had come from his wife
who had given him about S150 from her welfare check to
purchase some money orders for her. In an effort to
impeach the defendant's testimony, the prosecutor caused
the defendant to admit, on cross-examination, that he had
not offered that exculpatory information to the police at the
time of arrest.
36353 U.S. 391 (1957).
[Vol. 67
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probative value in determining the credibility of testi-
mony at trial. Therefore, the government's interest
in having the defendant's prior silence made known
is minimal, whereas the potential for prejudice to
the defendant is great, since the jury is likely to
accord much more weight to the defendant's prior in-
vocation of his privilege against self-incrimination
than is warranted. .3
Doyle takes Hale's evidentiary holding a step
further by giving it a constitutional basis in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. An
individual is now assured that if he decides, after
having received the Miranda warnings, that he
wishes to invoke his right to remain silent, the State
cannot use his silence against him at trial because to
do so would constitute a deprivation of due process.
However, this constitutional basis is a narrow one,
one which applies only to situations where the police
do in fact give an arrestee his Miranda warnings
before beginning custodial interrogation. As the
dissent points out in Doyle, if no Miranda warnings
are given and the suspect chooses to remain silent,
the prosecutor would not, under the rationale of the
majority in Doyle, be constitutionally prohibited
from using this silence to impeach the suspect's
exculpatory trial testimony.
Doyle's holding may supply an incentive to police
to neglect to give the Miranda warnings. If the police
have just arrested a suspect who they are relatively
sure will not confess, it may be to their advantage to
avoid giving the Miranda warnings. This would be
advantageous because the suspect's silence could then
be used against him at trial to impeach any exculpa-
tory testimony, whereas if they gave the Miranda
warnings, use of his silence at trial for impeachment
purposes would be prohibited by Doyle. It is conceiv-
able, therefore, that the holding in Doyle might
under certain circumstances result in a deliberate
circumvention of the dictates of the Miranda deci-
sion.
This unsavory result could have been avoided had
the Court based its holding in Doyle on a fifth
amendment right on the part of a defendant not to
have his assertion of his right against self-incrimina-
tion used to impeach his trial testimony. As was
stated in Malloy v. Hogan, 31 what the fifth amend-
3422 U.S. at 176-77.
38378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Malloy, the petitioner was
arrested and pleaded guilty to a gambling offense. About 16
months later, he was ordered to testify before a referee
appointed to conduct an investigation of alleged gambling
activities in the county. When asked certain questions
concerning his arrest and conviction, he pleaded the fifth
ment was designed to guarantee is "the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty ... for such silence." "
In Griffin v. California, 40 where the trial court
allowed comment upon the defendant's refusal to
testify in his own defense as tending to prove his
guilt, the Court held that to allow this would impose
an unconstitutional penalty upon the defendant's
exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. "It [would infringe upon] the privi-
lege by making its assertion costly." 41 While it is
true that in Griffin the prosecutor was prohibited
from using the defendant's invocation of his right to
remain silent as evidence of guilt as opposed to mere
use for impeachment purposes, 42the rationale of the
case is applicable to the issue at hand. Allowing the
prosecutor to use the defendant's prior silence to im-
peach his exculpatory trial testimony is as much an
imposition of a penalty upon the defendant's asser-
tion of his fifth amendment privilege as is allowing
the prosecutor to use that silence as evidence of
guilt. " Moreover, in Spevack v. Klein, "" where an
amendment and the County Court adjudged him in con-
tempt of court and had him placed in prison until he was
ready to answer. Petitioner then applied for a writ of habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment and that, consequently, the
state's action against the petitioner, constituting an uncon-
stitutional abridgement of that privilege, was impermissi-
ble.
.91d. at 8.
'°380 U.S. 609 (1965).
"Id. at 614.
"2Another distinction could be made. In Griffin the
defendant asserted his right to remain silent at the time of
trial as opposed to the time of arrest and police interroga-
tion. However, this distinction is irrelevant. As was stated
in Gillison v. United States, 399 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1968):
In Griffin v. State of California the Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment forbids prosecutor and
court from commenting on an accused's failure to
testify on his own behalf. The distance between that
issue and the prosecutor's comments . . . about the
accused's failure to make an exculpatory statement
upon arrest is infinitesimal. Indeed in Miranda v.
State of Arizona, the . . . Court recognized the
applicability of Griffin to this [very] situation ...
(emphasis added).
4 Circuit courts dealing with the issue have reached
conflicting results. Some have found violations of the fifth
amendment privilege in a prosecutor's use of a defendant's
silence to impeach his trial testimony in that such use
constituted an impermissible inference drawn from the
defendant's refusal to speak: United States v. Anderson,
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attorney was disbarred for asserting his privilege
against self-incrimination before a judicial discipli-
nary proceeding, it was held that the "imposition of
any sanction which makes the assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege 'costly'" "' would amount to
an impermissible penalty upon the exercise of that
privilege. Certainly, prosecutorial use of a defen-
dant's silence to impeach his exculpatory trial testi-
mony would constitute an imposition of a sanction
which would make the defendant's exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination costly. "'
Had the Court in Doyle adopted the fifth amend-
ment rationale instead of using the due process
theory, it would have avoided giving police an
incentive to circumvent the dictates of Miranda.
Perhaps the reason that the majority in Doyle
declined to use this fifth amendment rationale is that
it was faced with the fact that Raffel v. United
498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'don other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Johnson
v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 878 (1973); United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d
1206 (2nd Cir. 1970); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d
1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48
(9th Cir. 1969). However, other circuit courts have declined
to invalidate prosecutorial use of a defendant's prior silence
to impeach his trial testimony on fifth amendment grounds
and have instead employed the type of analysis used in
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (see
text accompanying notes 25-29 supra): United States v.
Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971); United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey,
475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).
See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Grunewald,
in which he argues that the prosecutor's use, for impeach-
ment purposes of the defendant's prior silence in that case
constituted an impermissible penalty imposed upon the
defendant's assertion of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, stating:
I can think of no special circumstances that would
justify use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or
convict a person who asserts it. The value of constitu-
tional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be
penalized for relying on them.
353 U.S. at 425.
'"385 U.S. 511 (1967).
"Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
'Such was the rationale employed in Fowle and the like
cases noted at note 43 supra. See also United States ex rel.
Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613, 616 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973), where the court stated:
Griffin holds broadly that . . . the relevant ques-
tion is whether the particular defendant had been
harmed by the state's use of the fact that he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct.
Certainly, impeachment of the defendant's exculpatory
testimony at trial harms the defendant.
States"7 had held that the fifth amendment did not
prohibit use of a defendant's prior assertion of his
right to remain silent to impeach his exculpatory
trial testimony. " This seeming difficulty posed by
Raffel, however, could have been overcome by the
majority had it desired to base its holding upon
fifth amendment grounds. It is doubtful that Raffel
and the rationale supporting it could withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny today in light of the Court's holdings
in Griffin and Spevack. "'If by taking the stand in his
own defense the defendant not only waives the privi-
lege at that time but also opens himself up to com-
ment and questions by the prosecution about his
prior silence, this would certainly constitute the "im-
position of [a] sanction which makes assertion of the
privilege 'costly"' "within the meaning of Griffin and
Spevack.
Michigan v. Mosley 5 concerns a defendant who
was arrested in connection with several robberies and
was fully advised of his rights in accordance with
Miranda v. Arizona. 52 When questioned about the
robberies at the police station, he asserted his right to
remain silent and the detective halted the interroga-
tion. Two hours later, however, another detective
took the defendant to another part of the building,
again advised him of his rights under Miranda, in-
terrogated him concerning a murder, and eventually
elicited a confession from him. The defendant was
subsequently tried and convicted of murder. The
conviction, however, was reversed on appeal, "s the
Michigan appellate court finding a per se violation of
the Miranda dictate that once the subject of police
custodial interrogation indicates that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease. The
action of the police in resuming the interrogation was
viewed by the court as an attempt to circumvent the
Miranda dictate "by the simple expedient of shut-
tling a person from one police officer to another for
purposes of questioning and thus [attempting to
justify] subsequent interrogation after an election to
remain silent." "'The police, said the court, had con-
47271 U.S. 494 (1926).
"See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
"Indeed, Justice Black in his concurring opinion in
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), ex-
presses doubt that Raffel has any vitality today. He con-
cludes, moreover, that to the extent that it does, it should
be expressly overruled.
"Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967).
"423 U.S. 96 (1975).
'2384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 214 N.W. 2d
564 (1974), leave to appeal denied, 392 Mich. 764 (1974).
4Id. at 108, 214 N.W. 2d at 566.
(Vol. 67
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tinued to interrogate the defendant after he had indi-
cated that he wished to remain silent, thus violating
Miranda.
The Supreme Court in Miranda examined this
possible violation of a defendant's rights:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he had shown that he intends
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any state-
ment taken after the person invokes his privilege can-
not be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the
setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome his free choice in producing a
statement after the privilege has been once invoked. "
The Mosley majority found that this passage from
Miranda was susceptible of numerous interpreta-
tions. First, the passage could be interpreted to mean
that a suspect could never again be questioned by any
police officer at any time or place, on any subject,
once the right to remain silent had been asserted.
Second, it could mean that any statement obtained
from the subject after he had once invoked his right to
remain silent, even if volunteered by him without any
further police interrogation whatsoever, must be
considered a product of compulsion and therefore
inadmissible in evidence at trial. Third, the Miranda
passage could be read as requiring only the immedi-
ate cessation of questioning and allowing resumption
after a mere momentary pause. "The Court charac-
terized all of these literal interpretations as capable
of leading to "absurd and unintended results," 57 and
concluded that at some point in time, resumption of
questioning must be permissible.
"1384 U.S. at 436.
56423 U.S. at 101-02.
5 7 1d. at 102.
"The majority of federal and state courts, as the
majority in Mosley points out, 423 U.S. at 103 n.9, have
held that Miranda does not per se prohibit all subsequent
interrogation after the suspect has once asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege. The state courts so holding have
stressed (1) the voluntariness of the subsequent confessions
obtained, People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d 39, 302 N.E.2d 7
(1973); State v. McClelland, 164 N.W. 2d 189 (1969);
State v. Law, 214 Kan. 643, 522 P.2d 320 (1974); Con-
way v. State, 7 Md. App:. 400, 256 A.2d 178 (1969);
State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438 (1968);
Commonweath v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730
(1972); State v. Robinson, 87 S.D. 375, 209 N.W.2d 374
(1973); Hill v. State, 429 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968); (2) the fact that the renewed questioning did not
The Court then went on to formulate a standard
by which to determine the point in time when ques-
tioning could be resumed. Because the purpose be-
hind the Miranda decision was to "adopt fully effec-
tive means... [of notifying] the person of his right of
silence and [of assuring] that the exercise of the right
will be scrupulously honored," " the Court con-
cluded that the admissibility of statements obtained
from a subject of police interrogation after that sub-
ject had once asserted his right to remain silent de-
pended upon whether his "right to cut off question-
ing [had been] scrupulously honored." '0 Applying
this formula to the case at hand, the Court found that
the defendant's prior decision to cut off questioning
had been scrupulously honored by the police based
on the fact that questioning of the defendant was not
resumed until more than two hours had elapsed, that
the second interrogation which led to the voluntary
confession was conducted by a different officer, at
another location, about an unrelated crime, and that
the second officer had again read the defendant his
rights under the Miranda doctrine.
amount to incessant harassment by the police for the
purpose of breaking down the will of the suspect, in other
words, that Miranda interdicted only those situations
where the police refuse to take no for an answer and
continue questioning after the suspect has asserted his right
to remain silent. People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, 509
P.2d 1235 (1973); State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158
S.E.2d 511 (1968); or (3) the fact that the defendant must
have known that he had indicated a desire to remain silent,
this request would have been honored because it had been
so when he previously asserted the right, State v. O'Neil,
299 Minn. 60, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974); State v. Estrada,
63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974).
59384 U.S. at 479. In Miranda the Court, in holding
that procedural safeguards were necessary to ensure that
the suspect's free exercise of his fifth amendment privilege
would be unfettered, reasoned that the atmosphere of police
custodial interrogation was such that this free exercise of the
privilege was imperiled:
Even without employing brutality [or] the "third
degree".. .the very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on
the weakness of individuals .....
In each of the eases [now before us], the defendant
was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run
through menacing police interrogation procedures.
The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully appar-
ent.
1d. at 455, 457-58 (citations omitted).
60423 U.S. at 104.
"'The Court also distinguished Westover v. United
States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a companion case to Miranda,
which the Michigan Court of Appeals had found disposi-
tive. In Westover the defendant was arrested and ques-
tioned by local police from 9:45 p.m. until noon the next
day. Three F.B.I. agents then took over, gave advisory
19761
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Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, took
issue with the majority's presentation of the facts.
The majority found that the second interrogation had
concerned "an unrelated holdup murder." 62 How-
ever, the dissent pointed out that the officer who
arrested the defendant had done so on the basis of an
anonymous tip which embraced not only the robber-
ies that were the subject of the first interrogation but
also the robbery-murder that was the subject of the
second interrogation. The defendant was suspected of
all these crimes. Therefore, the second interrogation
did not concern an unrelated crime.
Moreover, the majority's characterization of the
second interrogation as having taken place "at
another location" 3 was criticized by the dissent as
misleading. The second interrogation was conducted
merely on a different floor of the same building. In
light of these facts, the dissent argued that even under
the standard formulated by the majority, the inculpa-
tory statements obtained during the course of the
second interrogation must be held inadmissible
because the defendant's decision to cut off question-
ing had not been scrupulously honored. Rather, the
second interrogation was a deliberate attempt on the
part of the police to circumvent the dictates of
Miranda. It was a ploy to elicit a confession from the
accused.
Although the dissenters agreed that Miranda was
not to be read as imposing an absolute ban on the re-
sumption of questioning after the suspect in custody
has once invoked his right to remain silent, they
nonetheless felt that resumed questioning must be
conditioned upon procedural safeguards for which
the majority's formula did not provide. 64 Miranda
warnings to the defendant, proceeded to question him about
different crimes, and eventually obtained his confession.
The Court held the confession inadmissible because:
Although the two law enforcement authorities are
legally distinct and the crimes for which they interro-
gated Westover were different, the impact on him was
that of a continuous period of questioning . ..
Despite the fact that the F.B.I. agents gave warnings
at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point
of view the warnings came at the end of the interroga-
tion process. In these circumstances an intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed.
Id. at 496. In contradistinction to Westover, the Court
noted, the police gave Mosley full Miranda warnings at the
outset of each interrogation, "subjected him to only a brief
period of initial questioning, and suspended questioning
entirely for a significant period before beginning the
interrogation that led to his incriminating statement." 423
U.S. at 106-07.
62423 U.S. at 118.
"Id. at 119.
"Id. at 115.
requires that the procedures approved be sufficient to
assure with reasonable certainty that a confession is
not obtained under the compulsion inherent in cus-
todial interrogation and detention. "The teaching of
Miranda is that "renewed questioning is itself part
of the process which invariably operates to overcome
the will of a suspect." 66 Therefore, statements ob-
tained as the result of renewed questioning are pre-
sumptively coerced. In response to renewed interro-
gation, the suspect must be able freely to exercise his
right to remain silent. But because the renewed
questioning is itself inherently coercive, it acts to
overbear the individual's free will in the exercise of
his right to remain silent. 67
The dissent suggested that the proper rule to
establish, one that would more adequately safeguard
the suspect's free exercise of his right to remain silent
in response to renewed questioning, would be to
demand that once the suspect has invoked his right to
remain silent, interrogation should not resume until
the appointment and arrival of counsel. This, the
dissent pointed out, would be the precise safeguard
that Miranda had deemed adequate for the protec-
tion of the suspect's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination during custodial interroga-
tion. 6"
Michigan v. Mosley purports to clear up a
question which Miranda had failed to settle conclu-
sively; namely, under what circumstances, if any,
may the police resume questioning of a suspect in
custody who has previously invoked his right to
"See note 9 supra.
66423 U.S. at 114.
67Indeed it was this deficiency that led the dissent to
conclude:
[T]he process of eroding Miranda rights, begun
with Harris . . . continues with today's holding that
police may renew the questioning of a suspect who has
once exercised his right to remain silent, provided the
suspect's right to cut off questioning has been "scru-
pulously honored." Today's distortion of Miranda's
constitutional principles can be viewed only as yet
another step toward the erosion and, I suppose,
ultimate overruling of Miranda's enforcement of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 112.
"The Court in Miranda had reasoned that the presence
of an attorney would be an adequate safeguard for a
suspect's fifth amendment privilege during police custodial
interrogation because his presence would "dispel the
compelling atmosphere of the interrogation," 384 U.S. at
465, thereby assuring that statements obtained were not the
product of compulsion. Presence of an attorney would
equalize the psychologically intimidating atmosphere of
police custodial situations. The suspect would no longer




remain silent in response to prior interrogation?
Miranda had stated that if the subject of a police
custodial interrogation indicated that he wished to
remain silent, then the interrogation must cease.
What the Court in Miranda did not say, however,
was whether or not it would be permissible to resume
the interrogation at some later time.
After Miranda, circuit courts employed differing
standards to factual situations involving subsequent
interrogations. In United States v. Crisp, 69 the
Seventh Circuit established a strict standard, holding
that once the individual has asserted his right to re-
main silent, the interrogation must cease until such
time as the suspect "voluntarily and spontaneously
invite [s] further discussion."" Once the privi-
lege has been invoked, said the court, "an interroga-
tor must not be allowed to seek its retraction. )
71
Consequently, police initiation of renewed question-
ing is impermissible. Interrogation can be resumed
only upon the initiation of the accused. 7'
69435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
947 (1971). In Crisp the defendant was convicted of armed
robbery. During F.B.I. interrogation, he had asserted his
fifth amendment privilege in regard to any question
concerning "any bank robbery." Id. at 357. The F.B.I.
agent conducting the interrogation continued questioning
him on other matters but eventually returned to the matter
of the bank robbery of which the defendant was suspected,
thereby constituting a resumption of questioning on a sub-
ject upon which the defendant had already asserted his right
to remain silent. At this time the agent was able to elicit




7'Accord, United States ex rel. Doss v. Bensinger, 463
F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 932 (1972);
People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1968). In Bensinger the defendant had asserted
his right to remain silent and the police had ceased
questioning. However, several hours later, the police
obtained a confession from the defendant by confronting
him with the confession of his accomplice. The court held
that the "police-initiated" resumption of interrogation was
impermissible. 463 F.2d at 579. The court reiterated the
Miranda dictate that once a suspect has asserted his right to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease, and quoted its
earlier holding in Crisp to the effect that this dictate, like all
the other dictates of Miranda, must be meticulously
honored by the police.
In Fioritto the defendant was arrested for burglary and,
in response to police interrogation, invoked his right to re-
main silent after receiving the Miranda warnings. The
police then confronted him with two accomplices who had
confessed and implicated him in the burglary. Shortly there-
after, the police again advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights and renewed the questioning, asking him if he would
like to confess. The defendant then signed a waiver of his
rights and confessed. The court held that this confession
In Jennings v. United States, " the Fifth Circuit
employed a much less restrictive standard for deter-
mining the permissibility of renewed interrogation.
There the court held that Miranda had intended to
interdict only those situations where an accused
asserts his right to remain silent but the police
disregard his claim and continue to interrogate him.
The court concluded that renewed questioning would
be permissible so long as the police do not relentlessly
harrass the suspect with questions; that is, so long as
the police halt interrogation each time the accused
asserts his right to remain silent. Similarly, the
was inadmissible because it violated the Miranda dictate
that once a suspect has asserted his right to remain silent
the interrogation must cease. Once the suspect has invoked
the privilege against self-incrimination, said the court, in-
terrogation can be resumed only upon the voluntary initi-
ation of the suspect.
A similar standard was employed in United States v.
Jackson, 436 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 906 (1971), where the defendant, after having been
arrested and advised of his rights in accordance with
Miranda, indicated that "he had some things to say but
would like to talk to his lawyer [first and] preferred to
wait a little while." Id. at 41. Four days later, the police
again advised the defendant of his rights and asked him if
he had changed his mind and was now willing to talk. The
defendant then signed a waiver and made incriminating
statements. In holding that these statements were admis-
sible at trial, the Court said:
We find nothing... in Miranda... to preclude
officers from again seeing a suspect in custody who has
indicated a potential willingness to talk, after a
reasonable interval, provided that their questioning is
for the limited purpose of finding out whether the
suspect has changed his mind.
Id. (emphasis added). But see United States v. Barnes,
432 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1970), where two defendants were
arrested on charges of smuggling marijuana and asserted
their right to remain silent in response to police interroga-
tion. They were confronted with an accomplice who had
also been arrested and had confessed. This accomplice
repeated her confession in the defendants' presence and the
police then resumed interrogation of the defendants, in
response to which they admitted their participation in the
smuggling scheme. The court held this a violation on the
Miranda dictate that once a suspect has expressed his desire
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
73391 F. 2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 868
(1968). In Jennings the defendant was arrested on suspi-
cion of transporting a stolen car across state lines. At the
police station, a local police officer fully advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights and began interrogation
but ceased when the defendant announced that he would
answer no further questions. Approximately one hour later,
an F.B.I. agent arrived and, not knowing of the prior
interrogation or of the defendant's assertion of his right to
remain silent, began questioning the defendant after first




Second Circuit held in United States v. Collins 7 that
a suspect's assertion of his right to remain silent does
not foreclose the police from later urging him to
reconsider his refusal to answer questions so long as
there is a lapse in time between the accused's
assertion of his privilege and the request for reconsid-
eration of this assertion. The Miranda warnings
must again be given to the suspect in a way that
will assure him that his exercise of his right to
remain silent will be honored, and the reconsidera-
tion should be urged by the police "in a careful,
noncoercive manner at not too great length." 75
When the accused has once asserted his right to re-
main silent in response to police interrogation, ques-
tioning may not be resumed "until new and adequate
warnings have been given and there is a reasonable
basis for inferring that the suspect has voluntarily
changed his mind." 7 6
In resolving the split among the circuits, Mosley
has chosen the less restrictive standard. So long as the
suspect's decision to cut off questioning is scrupu-
lously honored, questioning may be resumed at a
4462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988
(1972). In Collins the defendant was arrested by F.B.I.
agents and New York City detectives for armed robbery.
Immediately after arrest, he was advised of his rights under
Miranda, taken to the police station, and asked whether he
had any connection with the robbery. When he replied in
the negative and asserted that he would answer no more
questions, the interrogation ceased. Approximately five
hours later, after being transferred to F.B.I. headquarters,
he was again given the Miranda warnings and questioned.
Again he asserted his innocence and the questioning ceased.
The next morning, while the defendant was being trans-
ferred to the U.S. Attorney General's office, the F.B.I.
agents, after reading the defendant his rights, again
attempted to elicit answers from him regarding the robbery,
and again the defendant refused to answer. Upon meeting
with the Attorney General, the defendant was again advised
of his rights and asked if he wanted to make a statement. At
this time he confessed.
"5 Id. at 797. Accord, State v. O'Neil, 299 Minn. 60, 71,
216 N.W.2d 822, 829 (1974); State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d
476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974).
'6462 F.2d at 802. Accord, Hill v. Whealon, 490
F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1974), the defendant was arrested for
murder by local police and informed of his Miranda rights.
When asked if he wished to waive these rights, the
defendant responded unequivocally in the negative. An
hour and a half later, another officer, knowing of the
defendant's previous exercise of his right to remain silent,
truthfully informed him that an accomplice had confessed
and asked the defendant if he would like to talk. The
defendant agreed and the officer then again gave him his
Miranda warnings before he signed a waiver and confessed.
The Court held this confession admissible, citing Collins.
later time. It is not clear, however, how much time
must elapse.
At this point, it must be asked whether this
formula fulfills the purpose and rationale of Mi-
randa. The underlying rationale of Miranda7 7 is that
police custodial interrogation is so inherently coer-
cive that procedural safeguards are necessary to
protect an arrestee's basic fifth amendment rights.
The resumption of the interrogational process is also
assumed to be inherently coercive. Procedural safe-
guards are needed, then, not only at the inception of
the original questioning but also at the resumption of
interrogation. As the dissent points out, to scrupu-
lously honor the suspect's prior decision to remain
silent does not guarantee that the suspect will feel
free to assert his right to remain silent in response to
renewed questioning. Resumption of interrogation is
itself a part of the process that works to weaken the
suspect's will. It therefore becomes questionable
whether resumption of interrogation can ever be
consistent with scrupulously honoring the defend-
ant's fifth amendment privilege when resumption of
questioning acts to dissolve the free exercise of that
privilege. 78
The standard suggested by the dissent more
adequately comports with the purpose and rationale
of Miranda, while still fulfilling any practical need
for the resumption of questioning. The presence of an
attorney at the renewed interrogation would provide
a 'equate assurance that the second interrogation is
not coercive. In Miranda the Court stated:
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent,
but has an attorney present, there may be some
circumstances in which further questioning would be
permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing,
statements then made in the presence of counsel might
be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation
process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the
privilege for the purposes of these statements. "
Moreover, the "presence of an attorney" standard
would have the advantage of providing lower federal
courts with a simple viable test by which to deter-
inine the permissibility of renewed questioning in
particular cases. The diverse formulae previously
employed by federal courts would be replaced by a
uniform workable standard, as opposed to the nebu-
lous yardstick enunciated by the majority in Mosley.
"See note 9 supra.
"See note 17 supra.




Both Doyle v. Ohio and Michigan v. Mosley
respond to questions arising from the assertion by an
accused of his right to remain silent in response to
police custodial interrogation. The Miranda Court
had required that police advise a suspect in custody
that he has a right to remain silent and also
mandated that the defendant must not be penalized
for asserting the privilege. Doyle v. Ohio is an
expansion of Miranda, as it makes clear that this
proscription extends to prosecutorial use for
impeachment purposes of the defendant's silence
during interrogation. Michigan v. Mosley, permit-
ting police initiation of renewed questioning, must be
viewed as a constriction of the Miranda dictate that
once an individual asserts his right to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. This mandate has been
altered to read: once an individual asserts his right to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease for a
while.
19761
